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Abstract  
 There is a wide variety of research that has examined the extent to which humans use 
others for self-enhancement. Previous work has shown that people can expand their sense of self 
by using close others to boost self-esteem. Additionally, self-affirmation theory is a large part of 
the human psychological immune system, holding the power to boost the self and potentially 
protect self-esteem. Recent research has found that when facing negative feedback, people have 
a tendency to inflate their views of significant others in terms of positive characteristics, possibly 
to make themselves feel better (Brown & Han, 2012). The present research involves a 2 (self-
affirmation) x 2 (success vs. failure feedback) x 2 (friend vs. college student rating) factorial 
design. A significant three-way interaction revealed effects for state self-esteem, but not for 
partner ratings or task performance. Non-self-affirming participants who received failure 
feedback had higher self-esteem ratings versus non-self-affirming participants who received 
failure feedback and rated a college student.  
  
The Role of Self-affirmation and Self-expansion on State Self-esteem. 
 Early social psychological research speculated that humans tend to use self-enhancement 
methods in order to reestablish and/or protect self-esteem (James, 1915). Research by Allport 
(1943) suggests that these effects are egocentric. Essentially, when a person feels a threat to the 
ego (i.e. self-esteem threat), that person is likely to engage in a behavior to reduce the threat. To 
reduce or protect against threats to self-esteem, there are many strategies that a person might use; 
the focus of the present research concerns the strategies of self-affirmation and self-expansion.  
Self-Affirmation:  
A wide variety of research has shown that humans will engage in self-affirming behavior 
in response to a negative ego-threat (Steele, 1998; Aronson et al, 1999; Sherman and Cohen, 
2006). According to Sherman (2013), there are three basic uses of self-affirmation: to increase 
resources for coping with stress, to reduce bias (prejudice) in response to self-threat, and to 
decrease the impact of a threat to self-esteem. For instance, research by Steele (1975) showed 
that, in response to being viewed negatively (uncooperative in the community), participants were 
more likely to cooperate in community service tasks to self-affirm that they are a good, 
cooperative person. This effect was significant regardless of whether the negative feedback was 
relevant to cooperation (i.e., some participants were told they were bad drivers instead of 
uncooperative), showing that the purpose of helping was to reduce the impact of the negative 
feedback, regardless of its relevance to the threatened domain. 
More recent research has shown the real world effects of self-affirmation in attitude 
change (Cohen, Aronson, & Sherman, 2000). In a series of three studies, participants were 
placed into either a self-affirmation condition or a control condition, asked to read counter-
attitudinal articles, and then asked evaluative questions regarding the persuasiveness of the 
article and the credibility of the author. The results showed that participants who self-affirmed 
rated the articles as more persuasive, and they gave more favorable ratings to authors who 
presented opposing opinions than participants who did not self-affirm. Cohen et al. (2000) 
concluded that participants were less defensive in terms of attitude change due to a reduced need 
to self-protect.  
Further research supports that self-affirmation can be used as a protective measure 
against stress (Sherman & Hartson, 2011). For example, researchers measured norepinephrine 
and epinephrine levels (i.e., neurotransmitter markers of stress) of college students 14 days prior 
to an exam and also the day of the exam. Students who did not self-affirm showed increased 
epinephrine levels from the 14 day sample to the day of the exam; however, participants who 
self-affirmed did not show a significant increase in epinephrine levels (Sherman, Bunyan, et al., 
2009). Additionally, the effect was greater for participants who had a more negative evaluation 
of college (considered most “psychologically vulnerable”).  
Additional research supports that self-affirmation can be used as a protective measure 
against derogating others through stereotyping and prejudice (Fein & Spencer, 1997). For 
example, participants were randomly assigned to either a self-affirmation condition or a non-self-
affirmation condition. Participants were then asked to read a biography and watch an interview 
for a potential job candidate who was implied to be either Jewish (a marginalized group) or 
Italian (control group). Last, participants were asked to rate the candidate’s personality. 
Participants who did not self-affirm engaged in prejudice, giving significantly less favorable 
ratings to the candidate when she was implied to be Jewish; however, participants who self-
affirmed showed no significant differences in ratings of the candidate based on ethnicity.  
  The present research extended these findings to show that self-affirmation not only 
boosts the self following stressful situations, but also protects the self from direct self-esteem 
threats (e.g., negative performance feedback). If this is the case, then self-affirmation should 
reduce the need to use self-expansion following self-esteem threat— a clear indication that the 
affirmation is truly protecting self-esteem.  
 Inclusion of Others in the Self:  
 Following research on the self (James, 1915), people tend to incorporate significant 
others, friends, family, and others (teams/groups) into a person’s self-concept. For example, the 
self-expansion model (Aron & Aron, 1996) is founded upon the idea of inclusion of others in the 
self. Essentially, people adopt others’ self-concepts into their own self-concept to expand the self 
(Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Aron et al., 1991). Because people treat those who they 
incorporate into their sense of self as a part of their actual self, they are likely to view their 
opinions, strengths, and values as their own (Aron et al., 1991). Thus people can inflate their 
self-views by inflating their views of close-others.   
One result of this process is use of the self-enhancement strategy of basking in the 
reflected glory of others, such as when students identify with sports teams (Cialdini et al., 1976).  
More specifically, students more often identified with their school’s football team using the 
pronoun “we” when the team won and “they” when the team lost. Further research supports the 
notion that one not only uses sports teams to expand the self, but one also uses close individuals 
in whom the person is emotionally invested (Anderson & Chen, 2002). Expansion of this 
research has shown that a person must be significantly connected to an individual to use them for 
self-enhancement; however, the significance can be as minimal as being affiliated with the same 
organization (Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005).  
 More recent research by Brown and Han (2012) showed that participants are likely to use 
significant others (in this case a romantic partner) to increase self-esteem following negative 
feedback on a performance task. In a series of two studies, participants were given a version of 
the Remote Associates Test and were told that it was a measure of creative intelligence. They 
were then randomly assigned to either a success or failure condition. Those in the success 
condition were told that they scored within the top 87% of students at their university, and those 
in the failure condition were told that they scored within the bottom 23% of students at their 
university. Following the false-feedback, participants were asked to evaluate themselves, their 
significant other or most recent significant other, and (in study 2) most other people in terms of 
positive characteristics and values. Their findings indicated an overall effect showing that 
participants tend to increase the positivity of their views of their romantic partners in response to 
receiving negative feedback. Brown and Han (2012) concluded that evaluating their romantic 
partners more favorably restored one’s own self-esteem through association. Further, their 
findings indicated that only those who had a lower global self-esteem tended to inflate their 
views of their partners to a greater extent, whereas those with a higher global self-esteem did not 
significantly inflate views of their partners. Brown and Han suggest that those with a low global 
self-esteem use the partner to self-enhance because it is a form of indirect self-enhancement, 
whereas those with a high global self-esteem have better resources and tend to use direct forms 
of enhancement.           
The Present Research 
 The present research extended Brown and Han’s (2011) research on using close others to 
self-enhance. I sought to answer four main questions. First, I sought to extend Brown and Han’s 
findings by using close friends instead of romantic partners. This will allow for the examination 
of whether the effect is limited to romantic relationships or if the effect is applicable to other 
close relationships. Second, Brown and Han (2011) never assessed whether rating of the close 
other affected state self-esteem. Thus, because using a close other is thought to increase self-
esteem, I assessed state self-esteem following the ratings of a target (i.e., close friend or typical 
college student) to see if those who had the ability to enhance have a higher state self-esteem. 
Third, a person should be able to interchange self-enhancement/protection strategies (Tesser, 
2001). Thus I incorporated a self-affirmation condition prior to the negative feedback to assess 
whether or not participants who have the opportunity to self-affirm (protect self-esteem) will use 
the close-other enhancement. And fourth, because the participants were given feedback on an 
intelligence task, I assessed whether or not the aforementioned self-enhancement/protection 
strategies (close-other enhancement and self-affirmation) would impact performance on a GRE 
practice test after receiving negative feedback. Previous research (Schmeichel, Baumeister, & 
Vohs, 2003) has shown that participants will perform worse on intelligence based tasks after 
completing an analytical task prior to the intelligence task. For example, participants were first 
randomly assigned to either task that required attention or a control task. Following the task, 
participants were given 13 items from a GRE analytical section and evaluated for performance. 
Participants in the attention-dependent task performed worse and completed less GRE items, 
suggesting that ego depletion diminished intellectual ability on the second task (also known as 
the two-task paradigm). Our study examined the interaction between self-affirmation, self-
enhancement, and performance feedback on the first task to see if either of these factors 
increased persistence, allowing for reduced ego-depletion and better performance on the second 
task. This question has not been examined in ego depletion research.  
Hypothesis 
1. Participants would rate friends higher than average college students when faced with 
negative feedback compared to those who received positive feedback.  
2. In the failure condition, participants who self-affirmed would not enhance the ratings of 
friends as opposed to participants who did not self-affirm. 
3. In the failure condition, I expected self-affirmation to buffer state self-esteem. 
4. In the failure condition, those who did not self-affirm would experience a boost in state 
self-esteem after evaluating a friend rather than the average college student. 
5. In the failure condition, those who self affirmed would perform better on a GRE task than 
those who did not self-affirm.  
6. In the failure condition, those who did not self-affirm would perform better on a GRE 
task after rating a friend rather than after rating the average college student.  
 
Method 
Participants  
The participants consisted of 172 undergraduate Introductory Psychology students and 
undergraduate students from upper level courses at the Ohio State University Mansfield campus. 
Participants were 59.7% female and 40.3% of participants male. The average age of the 
participants was 19.93 (SD = 5.21). Participants took part in the study for either partial 
fulfillment of a research requirement or for extra credit. The design was a 2x2x2 factorial design. 
We could not reach the optimal level of participants (N = 400) due to a lack of available 
participants on our campus. 
Materials and Procedure   
Each participant reported to the lab alone. The study was portrayed as a measure of 
personality and performance. After completing an informed consent form, the participant was 
given the self-affirmation manipulation frequently used in self-affirmation research (Cohen, 
Aronson, & Steele, 2000). The manipulation was introduced as a measure of personal 
characteristics and values. In the affirmation condition, participants were given a sheet and asked 
to rank 11 characteristics in order of importance to them (i.e. relationships with family, 
creativity, etc.). These participants were then asked to write about a time when they experienced 
their top-ranked characteristic playing an important role in their lives. In the non-self-affirmation 
condition, participants were given the same sheet and asked again to rank their top 11 
characteristics (same characteristics). However, these participants were asked to write about their 
ninth ranked characteristic— a control measure that does not induce self-affirmation. In both 
conditions, participants were given as much time as they needed to complete the assessment. 
Following the affirmation manipulation, participants were given a version of the Remote 
Associates Test (RAT) and a “social sensitivity test” (a bogus test) used in prior research (Brown 
& Han, 2012). Following Brown and Han, participants were told that these tests measure creative 
intelligence. However, taking the test was simply used as a method for providing false feedback 
to participants. In the success condition, participants were given an easy version of the RAT and, 
following completion, were told that they scored in the top 87th percentile of students who have 
taken the test in the past. In the failure condition, participants were given a more difficult version 
of the RAT and, following completion, were told that they scored in the bottom 23rd percentile of 
students who have taken the test in the past. In both conditions, participants were given seven 
minutes to complete the tests (Brown & Han, 2012).  
Following the false feedback, participants were given an evaluation of positive characteristics 
(e.g., honest, kind) for either a close same-sex friend or an average college student. The 
evaluation of another person uses a five-point Likert scale (1 = very low, 3 = neutral, 5 = very 
high). Ratings were summed across the twelve items; internal reliability was adequate (α = .81, 
M = 43.43, SD = 6.50). Participants were also asked to complete a state self-esteem measure 
(“right now I feel good about myself”), which was taken from a 5 point Likert (1 = not at all, 3 = 
somewhat, 5 = extremely) state self-esteem scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). The mean for this 
scale was 3.55 (SD = .90). Following the other evaluation (in all conditions) participants were 
given 10 minutes to complete a series of analytical puzzles (GRE practice questions; Finkel et 
al., 2006), which were used as a performance measure (M problems solved = 7.44, SD = 2.21; M 
problems solved correctly = 3.88, SD = 2.05). All participants were told their scores after; 
however, they were told that the scores could not be compared to other students as the test is 
new.    
Following the analytical assessment, participants (in all conditions) were escorted by the 
experimenter to a computer and asked to fill out a series of personality inventories that are not 
analyzed in the present thesis. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed, 
thanked, and granted credit for participation.  
Results 
There were no effects due to sex, age, or race. Initially, a 2 (Self-affirmation condition) x 
2 (feedback) x 2 (Friend vs Student ratings) ANOVA was computed on ratings of the target. This 
analysis revealed a main effect for positive ratings, F (1, 162) = 52.847, p < .001. Higher ratings 
were given to friends (M = 46.42, SD = 6.54) than to students (M = 40.10, SD = 4.76). No other 
main effects nor interactions were significant. This did not support our initial hypothesis of 
ratings (H1 and H2).  
Next, a 2 (self-affirmation condition) x 2 (feedback) x 2 (friend vs student ratings) 
ANOVA was performed on the state self-esteem measure. This analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of success versus failure on state self-esteem, F (1,162) = 3.09, p = .049. Overall, 
those in the success condition (M = 3.69, SD = .87) rated higher for state self-esteem than those 
in the failure condition (M = 3.42, SD = .90), supporting the failure feedback as a self-esteem 
threat. There were no other significant main effects.  
However, this main effect was qualified by a significant three-way interaction on state 
self-esteem, F (1, 162) = 6.29, p = .01. Following success, participants reported higher self-
esteem when they did not self-affirm and rated a student (M = 3.86, SD = .91) versus rating a 
friend (M = 3.47, SD = .90). However, those who self-affirmed reported higher self-esteem after 
rating a friend (M = 3.77, SD = .68) versus a student (M = 3.58, SD = .96). In the failure 
condition, participants who did not self-affirm reported higher self-esteem after rating a friend 
(M = 3.63, SD = .76) than a student (M = 3.25, SD = .97).  Self-affirming participants reported 
higher self-esteem after rating a student (M = 3.52, SD = .93) than a friend (M = 3.25, SD = .97). 
See Figure 1.  
A test of the simple effects showed that those who did not self affirm, received success 
feedback and rated a college student had significantly higher self-esteem than those in the other 
condition, F (1,164) = 3.162, p < .08. Additionally, in the failure x no self-affirmation x friend 
condition there was a notable trend, F (1,164) = 2.39, p = .12. Although these results did not 
support self-affirmation as a means to buffer state self-esteem (H3), they do support our 
hypothesis that participants who did not self-affirmed, failed, and rated a friend would 
experience a boost in state self-esteem (H4).  
A 2 (Self-affirmation condition) x 2 (feedback) x 2 (Friend vs Student ratings) ANOVA 
on GRE items answered correctly did not show any significant effects or interactions, highest F 
(1,164) = 1.23, p = .27. Additionally, a 2 (Self-affirmation condition) x 2 (feedback) x 2 (Friend 
vs Student ratings) ANOVA on GRE completed did not show any significant effects or 
interactions, highest F (1,164) = 1.23, p = .27. These results did not support our hypothesis of 
increased performance (H5 and H6). 
Discussion 
The results did not support our initial hypotheses that participants would rate friends 
higher following failure rather than following success. However, unlike the Brown and Han 
(2012) study, I analyzed data for all participants and not just those with low global self-esteem. 
This supports the findings that that only participants with a low global self-esteem will use a self-
expansion to self-enhance. A follow-up study should test for both global self-esteem and state 
self-esteem to examine the differences between low global self-esteem and high global self-
esteem participants. I speculate that the partner ratings will replicate Brown and Han’s (2012) 
findings that those with low global self-esteem will rate friends higher following failure, but they 
will not do so when they have the chance to self-affirm prior to the failure feedback. 
Additionally, I used a between subjects design, whereas Brown and Han (2012) used a within-
subject design. It is possible that the comparison ratings were inflated in the within subjects 
design due to making a direct comparison.  
My results showed a significant three-way interaction on state self-esteem. In the failure 
condition, participants had the highest state self-esteem when they did not affirm and rated a 
friend. This supports Brown and Han’s (2012) speculation that using self-expansion (thinking 
about friends following failure) can contribute to higher self-esteem. However, there is also the 
potential that participants may have made a downward social comparison (“I failed on this task, 
but I am better than my friends”) as a defense mechanism to boost self-esteem (See Festinger, 
1954; Pyszczynski et al., 1985). Additional research has shown that making a downward social 
comparison is induced following failure (Gibbons et al., 2002). I speculate that this effect might 
be driven by both enhancement mechanisms. Overall, however, it is possible that rating friends 
reminded participants that they have significant relationships following failure, inflating self-
esteem. This is the most parsimonious explanation.   
Because those with a low global self-esteem tend to use indirect forms of enhancement 
(i.e. self-expansion) (See Brown & Han 2012; Brown, Collins, & Schmidt, 1988), I believe that 
these participants are more likely to use self-expansion to boost state self-esteem following the 
failure feedback. However, because participants with a high global self-esteem tend use more 
self-focused forms of enhancement, I believe that these participants are more likely to make a 
downward social comparisons to boost state self-esteem following the failure feedback.  
Conversely, in the success condition, participants had the highest state self-esteem when 
they did not affirm and rated a college student rather than a friend. The most likely explanation 
for this is that participants’ state self-esteems are higher through direct association to the success 
scores. It is possible when participants rate their friends following success, they engage in 
upward social comparisons (my friends are great) and feel worse about themselves than when 
comparing with college students (in which they have just been told they have performed better 
than the average). This follows previous research on upward comparisons showing that when 
people make upward social comparisons, they tend to suffer a deflation to self-esteem (Wheeler 
& Miyake, 2002). However, it also likely that participants increased their self-esteem through a 
downward social comparison of college students, simply because they are comparing themselves 
to the group in which they have been informed they have performed better than.  
Another potential limitation is that I did not have participants rate themselves on positive 
characteristics. I did not have the participants rate themselves because Brown and Han (2012) 
did not find any significant effects due to self-ratings. Also, I was looking at people using others 
to self-enhance, and thus was concerned with the friend ratings or college ratings; however, the 
results suggest that I may be witnessing a social comparison in addition to a self-expansion 
process. To accurately measure social comparison, a future study should compare ratings of both 
the self, a close friend, and the average college student.   
The results on performance show no evidence that success on a previous task or either a 
self-protective or self-enhancing task increases performance. Moreover, the results show no 
evidence for success on a previous task to replenish ego depletion (Schmeichel, Baumeister, & 
Vohs, 2003), even though positive affect has been shown to restore depletion (Tice, Baumeister, 
Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007). 
Future research can examine personality variables, such as narcissism. I would predict 
that those who score higher on narcissism would be more likely to benefit from the self-
affirmation measures in terms of self-protection. However, I would also expect more narcissistic 
participants to make a downward social comparison following failure to feel better about 
themselves. Thus I would expect to see the opposite trend in the failure condition with a higher 
self-esteem following the rating of a college student.   
The present study supported the hypothesis that people can increase state self-esteem 
simply by evaluating others following failure. Further research should examine these effects 
amongst those with low global self-esteem versus those with high global self-esteem. 
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Figure 1. State self-esteem by condition. 
 
